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This paper marks Social Security’s open group liability to market taking into account the 
riskiness of its aggregate benefit payments and tax receipts. The open group liability references 
the present value of the system’s net cash flow from now through the indefinite future. We treat 
the growth rates of the system’s aggregate benefits and taxes as implicit securities that are 
spanned by the returns on marketed securities. Our pricing of Social Security’s infinite horizon 
net liability builds on prior independent work by Blocker, Kotlikoff, and Ross (2009) and 
Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2009). Our results, which we view as preliminary, suggest that the 
market value of Social Security’s open group liability may be many times larger than the $15.1 
trillion stated in the Trustees’ Report. Unlike Blocker, Kotlikoff, and Ross (2009), this 
discrepancy between our financial valuation and Social Security’s does not reflect differences in 
the value assumed for the safe rate of return. To control for this factor, we simply follow Social 
Security (and Geanakoplos, et. al., 2009) in assuming a 2.9 percent safe real rate of discount. We 
also find that the precise marketed assets used to price future Social Security benefits and taxes 














There are many ways to measure the health of the U.S. Social Security system. In
particular, one can measure what it will cost to keep the system operating as is and what it
would cost to immediately shut the system down with respect to any additional tax payments or
beneﬁt accruals. The former measure is called Social Security’s open group liability. The later
measure is called Social Security accrued liability (alternatively, “shut down cost” or “maximium
transition cost”, where transition references moving to a privatized system).
This paper considers the system’s open group liability, but unlike the valuation procedures
used by the system’s actuaries and reported in the annual Trustees Report, our analysis adjusts
for the riskiness of future beneﬁt payments and tax receipts. This is surely a plus relative to
the current state of the valuation art, but it foregoes many of the microeconomic details used
in Social Security’s beneﬁt and tax projections.
Our method involves treating aggregate Social Security beneﬁt payments and tax receipts
as implicit ﬁnancial securities. Speciﬁcally, we model the growth rate of these aggregates as
implicit ﬁnancial assets whose returns are spanned by the current set of marketed securities.
In its January 1, 2009 the annual Social Security Administration (SSA) Trustees Report,
the Trustees put the present value of Social Security’s open group Old Age Survivors Disability
Insurance (OASDI) unfunded liability at $15.1 trillion2. To arrive at its estimate, SSA makes
beneﬁt and contribution projections by type of beneﬁt and contribution for various cohorts and
groups within cohorts. To this end, Social Security selects low, intermediate, and high growth
rates of fertility, mortality, real wages, etc. Then, for each set of assumptions, Social Security
treats future growth rates as sure things and discounts at the assumed safe rate of return.
The valuation methods proposed in this paper abstract from the determinants of demo-
graphic and individual beneﬁt accrual. Instead, we focus on only two growth rates, those of
2SSA 2009 Trustees Report is available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2009/trTOC.html
3aggregate OASDI beneﬁts and aggregate OASDI contributions. We then suppose that there ex-
ists securities whose payo s can be used to replicate the same return as the growth rate security
up to an idiosyncratic error (e.g., measurement error) that is not valued in the market. Next we
determine what ﬁnancial markets would pay for these securities by projecting the payo  growth
rates onto a set of returns for traded assets, i.e. by using simple ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions to detect the set of spanning assets.
We ﬁnd that the Social Security Administration (SSA) may be underestimating the size of
its open group unfunded liability by a factor of four to ﬁve. However, our results are preliminary
and highly sensitive to assumptions, including the set of spanning assets. In particular, the
inclusion of longer-term bond returns seems to destabilize the valuation of the growth rate
securities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of
two prior studies, Blocker, Kotliko , and Ross (2009), henceforth BKR, and Geanakoplos and
Zeldes (2009), henceforth GZ, on which this paper builds. Section three details the methodology
used to risk-adjust the open group net liability. Section four presents and discusses ﬁndings. The
last section summarizes key results and discusses the limitations of the methodology employed
as well as our plans for future work on the topic.
2 Literature Review
The two studies to which this paper most directly relate are those of BKR and GZ. The
BKR piece is of particular interest because this paper’s methodology draws heavily on their
approach. In their paper, BKR attempt to value SSA’s net operating liability to working-
age Americans rather than the accrued liability to that populaton. BKR focus solely on OAI
retirement beneﬁts and OASI taxes used to ﬁnance those beneﬁts. BKR report a net OAI
liability to current working-age Americans of $10.4 trillion, which is approximately 23% larger
4than the corresponding liability calculated using SSA’s intermediate constant wage-growth rate
and discount rate assumptions.
BKR show that the formula for a worker’s Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) can be
decomposed into the product of a) an idiosyncratic component, which is a function of the
average value across a worker’s workspan of the ratio of her covered earnings in a given year to
the economy-wide average wage in that year and b) a market component whose value depends
on how the ﬁnancial markets implicitly value average wage growth.
BKR specify a random e ects model for relative wages over the work span and use it to
estimate the idiosyncratic component of workers’ PIAs. The data used in this analysis come
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. BKR also show that the market component of the
PIA (the component of the PIA that is assumed to be priced by the market) corresponds to
a wage-growth security. For a worker born in year  , this market component or factor can be
written as the product of the current average wage, ¯ wt (where t    ), multiplied by cumulated
(through age 60) future wage growth rate factors, i.e.,
¯ w +60 =¯ wt
 +60  
k=t+1
(1 + gk), (1)
where gk is the growth rate of the real average wage in period k.
While SSA assumes a constant average wage growth rate, implying that all parts of (1)
are known at time t, BKR argue that such an assumption is at odds with the true wage-growth
rate process which, they show, is actually quite noisy. Therefore, they maintain the stochastic
growth rate assumption. As such, the product of the gross wage-growth rate factors in (1) is
the uncertain quantity of interest.
To see why this quantity represents the return from a wage-growth security, suppose
an individual holds $1 worth of the S&P 500 stock index at time k. Then the individual’s
portfolio in one year is worth $1 · (1 + rk) where rk is the net rate of return on the S&P 500
5over that holding period. If the individual holds this portfolio for two periods, then his return
is $1 · (1 + rk)(1 + rk+1). Clearly the return for the generalized T-period horizon takes the
very same form as the product of the wage-growth rates. Therefore, BKR suggest considering
a hypothetical security which pays not the return on the S&P 500, but an annual rate of return
equal to the annual growth rate in average real wages.
Interpreting the product of the wage-growth rate factors as the payo  of a ﬁnancial secu-
rity leads naturally to the question: How much would the market pay for $1 of this security. Note
that such a security does not currently exist in ﬁnancial markets. Therefore, BKR project the
wage growth rates onto the space spanned by the returns of regularly traded assets. Speciﬁcally,
BKR regress aggregate wage-growth rates on a constant and a set of n asset returns
gt =   +
n  
i=1
 isi,t +  t, (2)
where si,t is the return on asset i for period t and  t is an idiosyncratic error term that is uncor-
related with asset returns. Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) then suggests that the price of the
wage growth security equals the value of the replicating portfolio of traded assets, assuming that
the replicating portfolio captures and prices all of the non-idiosyncratic return characteristics
of the wage-growth rate. They also run a similar regression except using one-period lags of the
asset returns.
To see how one goes from these coe cients to valuing wage growth securities, rewrite
regression (2) in the following manner:
1+gt =  (1 + r)+
n  
i=1
 i(1 + si,t)+ t, (3)
where r is the safe rate of return and   is deﬁned to make the two versions of the regressions
consistent. In this format, it’s easy to see that investing 1 dollar for one period in the wage
6growth security will yield, except for an assumed valueless error, the same return as investing
  in the safe asset and  i in risky asset i. So the sum of   and the  is is the total value of
the 1 dollar wage growth security held for one period. Let’s suppose this value is 79 cents; i.e.,
investing 1 dollar for one period in the wage growth security is equivalent to investing 79 cents
in safe and risky assets.
But why would anyone want to invest 1 when doing so in the required manner is only
worth 79? The answer is because they are forced to. Social Security isn’t a voluntary system.
We have to pay the taxes for which we are liable, and we are also forced to accrue the beneﬁts the
system provides conditional on what we earn. Incidentally, there is nothing that requires that
1 invested in the wage-growth security for one period be worth less than 1. It could be worth
more than 1 depending on the size of the coe cients, which are capturing how the security’s
mean (how it will preform on average) and its co-movement with the risky marketed assets.
So how much is a two-period wage-growth security worth, where again, the security exists
and is being held by its owner, at least initially? I.e., what’s the market value of being told that
someone (Uncle Sam, for example) has invested for you 1 dollar today and he will pay you at
the end of two periods the 1 compounded for two periods at the prevailing wage-growth rate?
The answer is 79 cents x 79 cents. The reason is that this security must, by arbitrage, have the
same value as cashing it out today for 79 cent, investing it in the safe asset and thus ending up
a period from now with 79 cents times (1 + r) and then investing/being forced to invest that
amount in the one-period wage-growth security that is worth 79 cents for each dollar invested.
So the original investment translates into 79 cents times (1+r) times 79 cents. But discounted
back to today, that’s simply 79 cents squared. This arbitrage reasoning carries through to any
holding period, so the value of an n-period wage-growth security is 79 cents raised to the power
n. BKR view each future year’s tax payments and beneﬁts receipts as involving, apart from the
idiosyncratic component, a wage growth security of a speciﬁc maturity; i.e., OASDI taxes to
be paid 15 years from the present involve a 15-year wage-growth security because the holding
7period on the security is 15 years.
Armed with estimates of the idiosyncratic and market valuation components of a worker’s
beneﬁts, BKR then calculate the present value of the aggregate beneﬁts currently owed to
working-age Americans. Through a similar process they value the aggregate taxes. The dif-
ference between these two valuations produces a net operating liability in real 2005 dollars of
$10.4 trillion, where, again, the term “operating” references the assumption that Social Secu-
rity’s tax and beneﬁt provisions will be maintained in their current form. The BKR estimate
is approximately 23% larger than the number calculated via the SSA’s wage-growth valuation
formula, which values wage growth based on an assumed, time-invariant, growth rate of the
economy-wide average wage.
To be clear, the sole di erence between the BKR and Social Security OAI valuations in
the BKR study, as opposed to the current study, is the method used to value the wage growth
security. I.e., BKR employ a micro-based strategy in determining and valuing the idiosyncratic
component of the worker’s primary insurance amount, which is similar to the method that
Social Security would use to understand expected di erences across workers in their future
Social Security beneﬁts and taxes. And to focus attention solely on the method of valuing the
wage-growth security, BKR, in forming both their own and the Social Security valuations of the
total unfunded operating liability to Americans of working age in 2005, BKR value/measure
each worker’s idiosyncratic component the same way. As BKR discuss, the main reason that
the two valuations di er is that Social Security discounts future average wage growth at its
assumed 2.9 percent safe rate, whereas BKR use the prevailing, in 2005, term structure of
yields on Treasury Inﬂation Protected Securities (TIPS). The TIPS yields in 2005 varied from
around 1%, at the short-end of the term structure, to 2.4% at the long, i.e., 30-year end of the
term structure.
The valuation di erences depend, then, in large part on how Social Security values safety
8as opposed to risk. Take a worker who is age 58 and is expected to start collecting beneﬁts at age
62. Although his ultimate PIA remains uncertain, once his received beneﬁt is received, it will be
paid for sure as long as he lives. I.e., it will be paid in the form of an inﬂation-protected annuity.
This is an annuity being provided by the government and the only appropriate discount rate(s)
to use to value such an annuity is the prevailing TIPS term structure. This is an important
di erence not only between how Social Security forms its valuations, but also, as we’ll indicate
momentarily, how GZ formulates their valuation. GZ follows Social Security in assuming a ﬁxed
2.9 percent real rate of discount.
In the current paper, we too adopt the 2.9 percent real discount rate, but the reason for
doing so is that the vast majority of, in this case, OASDI future beneﬁts and taxes lie in the
very distant future. Since the longest maturity TIPS is now less than 30 years and since the
TIPS yields rise sharply with maturity, it’s quite possible that were, say, 50-year TIPS to be
ﬂoated on the market, they would yield 2.9% after inﬂation. Because of this uncertainty and to
help limit the possible sources of di erences between our open group unfunded liability estimate
and SSA’s, we use the 2.9 percent rate here, while maintaining that doing so in the BKR study,
which is looking at shorter-term liabilities would have been inappropriate.
In contrast to the BKR conclusion Social Security is understating its liabilities, GZ suggest
the opposite is true. GZ estimate the OAI accrued beneﬁt liability to be 20% less than would
arise based on SSA’s valuation methodology. As indicated, GZ assume a 2.9% safe real discount
rate notwithstanding the fact that they are considering relatively short-term liabilities. Simply
using the prevailing TIPS term structure could, potentially, overturn their main ﬁnding. This
is not to suggest that using the TIPS term structure of yields is precisely the right way to
discount real cash ﬂows provided by the government. The reported yields are calculated under
the assumption that the coupons on the TIPS can be reinvested at the same internal rate of
return. What’s really needed to precisely value safe (as in government provided) real cash ﬂows
of di erent maturities is the prevailing prices on zero-coupon TIPS. Unfortunately, there is no
9zero-coupon TIPS market from which to cull these prices.
The GZ approach to valuing wage growth also di ers from that in BKR on several fronts.
Whereas BKR assume a simple linear relationship between aggregate wage growth rates and
asset returns, GZ model the log wage-growth rate over a horizon of h periods as a function of
the current log wage-dividend ratio:







h    
 
wt   dt   ¯ wd
 
h +  w w,t (4)
where gw and  w are the growth rate and volatility of the wage process, respectively, dt is the
the value of dividends at time t and ¯ wd is the long-run wage-dividend ratio. GZ use this mean-
reverting speciﬁcation to capture the long-run relationship between stock markets and wages.
However, upon closer inspection, one can see that (4) appears to suggest that the log-wage
growth rate is a function of the relative levels of wages and dividends. This is not the same as
(2), which is a regression strictly in rates. To see that (4) is focused on predicting the level of
future wages, not that it can be rewritten as an hth-order autoregressive distributed lag (ADL)







+   ¯ wd
 
h + (1    )wt +  dt +  w w,t (5)
Note that (5) places very stringent restrictions on the manner in which the current value of the
stock market, which GZ assume is proportional to dividends, relates to the level of future wages.
There also seems to be some confusion in the GZ paper about whether the study is focused on
the future level of aggregate wages or wages per worker. Similarly, there is a ﬂipping back and
forth between the level of total dividends and the dividend-price ratio. These concerns aside,
GK and BKR do ﬁrmly agree on their key point, namely that government obligations to and
claims on the public are risky and need to be valued taking that risk into account.
10Since Social Security is an ongoing enterprise, the most important liability to be measured
is not what’s owed just to current workers or what would be owed were the system to be closed
down, at the margin, but what the system owns, in total and on net, in continuing to operate
in its current form. This is the lability to whose measurement we now turn.
3 Methodology
As previously mentioned, the techniques employed in this paper are closely related to
those in BKR. The major di erences is that we are focusing on OASDI, not just OAI, i.e.,
we are focusing on the entire program and we are calculating the open group net liability by
working with aggregate total outﬂows and inﬂows of the system over the inﬁnite horizon. So we
are considering growth rate securities where the growth rate is not with respect to a per capita
value, like the economy-wide average wage, but rather with respect to aggregate amounts of
beneﬁts and tax payments. Thus there are no demographic cohorts or idiosyncratic components
that need to be weighted and summed to form the aggregate liability. Formally, the open group
net liability at time t, denoted  t, is deﬁned as follows:
 t = PVt(Future Outﬂows)   PVt(Future Inﬂows),
where PVt(·) is the risk-adjusted present value operator given information up to time t. Let yT
denote the outﬂow at time T. Note that this future quantity is related to the current value, yt,




(1 + gy,t+i), (6)
where gy,t+i) is the growth rate of aggregate beneﬁt payments between periods t and t + 1.
Establishing an analogous relationship for the total inﬂow, referenced by z, the equation for  
11becomes:
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where the second equality follows from the fact that yt and zt are known at time t and that the
PV(·) function is a linear operator.
As equation (7) shows, the key to calculating the open group unfunded liability lies in
calculating the present value of the product of future growth-rate factors, which are unknown
in the current period. This is where the BKR method has an intuitive appeal. Suppose there
exists a security that pays a return equal to the growth rate of the total outﬂow from the
social security system over the next period. That is, a one dollar investment in this security at
time t will pay the holder 1 + gy,t+1 at time t + 1. A two-period security will pay the holder
(1 + gy,t+1)(1 + gy,t+2) at time t + 2. Continuing in this fashion, one can see that  t is just the
sum of the prices of these securities. Let Gy,t,i denote the value of this hypothetical security,
where y indicates the growth rate on which the payo  is based, t indicates the current time,
and i indicates the number of periods to maturity. Then the unfunded obligation formula can
be rewritten as follows:
 t = yt
   
i=1
Gy,t,i   zt
   
i=1
Gz,t,i (8)
Note that  t is well-deﬁned so long as the inﬁnite sums converge, which means that the price of
the growth rate security must converge to zero as the number of holding periods increases to
inﬁnity.
Equation (8) indicates that all we need in order to calculate the unfunded liability are the
values of the growth rate securities. First consider the value of the one period security. If the
price of this asset was determined in ﬁnancial markets, we know from the First Fundamental
12Theorem of Asset Pricing that Gy,t,1 equals the expected payout at time t + 1, discounted at








Now suppose we regress the outﬂow or inﬂow one-period growth rate on a constant and the
contemporaneous returns from n traded securities as in (2). Assuming that this regression
captures all of the aspects of the outﬂow growth rate that are priced by the market, except for
an idiosyncratic noise term that is uncorrelated with the asset returns, then we can move (2)
one period forward, add one to both sides, and then take expectations under the risk-neutral
measure:
EQ






 isi,t+1 +  t+1
 




where the second equality follows from the fact that the expected return on any traded asset
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This is the result derived in BKR. Note that the right hand side of (11) is independent of time,
which suggests that the price of the wage security with one period to maturity is the same
regardless of the current time. That is, Gy,t,1 = Gy,u,1 = Gy,1 for any times t and u.
3Throughout the paper, the terms “equivalent martingale measure,” the “risk-neutral” measure, and the “Q”
measure are used interchangably.
13Now consider the same security but with two periods remaining to maturity. The payo 

































where the second equality follows from the law of iterated expectations. Notice that Gy,t,2 is
also independent of time. As shown in the appendix, the two-period case extends analogously
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This pricing formula satisﬁes the convergence requirements of (8) so long as the following rela-
tionship between r and the regression parameters holds










Equation (13) provides a means of generating an estimate of the open group net liability
using only contemporaneous asset returns. However, as GZ have argued in the case of wages,
the growth rates of l social security outﬂows and inﬂows may have little correlation with current
real asset returns. This conjecture is supported by our contemporaneous regressions, not shown,
for social security beneﬁts and contributions where the parameters on the returns are not
signiﬁcantly di erent from zero and the R2 values are very small. However, the correlation over
14longer horizons is likely to be signiﬁcant. This is the relationship that GZ try to capture with
their mean-reverting structure. As (5) shows, however, their e orts can simply be reformulated
as an autoregressive distributed lag model in wage levels. We suggest keeping the regression in
growth rates for simplicity and ﬂexibility. One approach, taken by BKR, is to extend (??) to
incorporate lagged asset returns. That is, one can regress outﬂow growth rates on a constant
and asset returns from h periods ago:
gy,t =   +
n  
i=1
 isi,t h +  t (14)



















This asset price converges to zero with the length of maturity of the asset under the same
conditions as (13). Note that (14) does not allow for both contemporaneous and lagged values
of asset returns on the right-hand-side. Moreover, it does not allow more than one lag length
to explain outﬂow or inﬂow growth rates. These restrictions allow the growth rate security to
be priced without making strong assumptions about the covariance structure of higher order
moments of asset returns. Indeed, if one doesn’t limit the regression to include only assets
returns that arise in one and only one period (be that period the current period of a period in the
past), one ends up with asset pricing formulas that are remarkably complex and exceptionally
demanding in terms of estimation. So using lagged regressors is important, based on what the
data tell us, but we’re stuck with the theory e ectively restricting us to trying one lag length
at a time. Thus, while we use the BKR approach below, we also consider two other approaches
to the pricing of the growth rate securities.
Before explaining these two approaches, let us belabor the problem we face here via an
example. Suppose we are trying to price a 1-quarter aggregate beneﬁts growth-rate security, i.e.,
15a security that pays, in one quarter, 1 times the growth-rate factor over the next quarter. If we
estimate a regression of guarterly aggregate beneﬁt growth rates against, say, security returns
lagged ﬁve periods, there is no problem in deriving a simple pricing formula for the security.
Nor is there a problem if we include a number of lags in the regression. The problem arises if we
include more than one lag in this regression and try to use the results from this 1-quarter growth-
rate regression to price assets of other maturities, say seven quarters. Our proposed solution,
for which we have two variants (KK1 and KK2), then, involves running separate regressions for
each maturity. A simple way to think of this is to view growth-rate securities of one maturity as
completely di erent from growth-rate securities of a di erent maturity. Thus we can call a 15
quarter aggregate beneﬁts growth rate security the apple growth rate security and a 22-quarter
aggregate beneﬁts growth rate security as the banana growth rate security. If the growth rates
in question were really about growth in apple consumption over 15 quarters and growth in
banana consumption over 22 quarters, and there were no apple growth rate securities of any
other maturity nor any banana growth-rate security of any other maturity, we’d simply price the
apples growth-rate security on its own and the bananas growth-rate security on its own. In this
case, the problem we are raising would never come up because we wouldn’t immediately connect
the growth rate in apples of 15 quarters with the growth rate in bananas over 22 quarters.
Returning to the speciﬁcs, our two KK1 and KK2 approaches are based on the observation
that we can view an h period growth-rate security as in equation (13) as delivering the product



















This equivalence implies that instead of modeling the one quarter growth rates we can model the
growth rates over more general time horizons. In theory, the absence of arbitrage implies that
these two expectations have the same value. That is, if the true parameters of either regression
16are known, then the security prices of both methods will be identical. In practice, however,
regressions are inevitably estimated with ﬁnite data sets, which can cause di erences in these
values. Intuitively, the regression that produces more accurate parameters will also produce a
more accurate value of the growth rate security.
To model growth rates over longer horizons, we employ two variations of the BKR tech-
nique. In the ﬁrst method, which we the call the KK1 method, we regress growth rates over a
general time interval against the one period asset returns over the same horizon. That is, for
an h-period horizon, we regress
gy,h,t =  h +
n  
i=1
h 1  
j=0
 h,ijsi,t j +  t (17)
where gy,h,t is the growth rate of y from time t   h to t. Note that for h = 1, (17) is identical
























(1 + r)h (18)
Notice that Gy,t,h depends on the parameters from the h-period regression. Rather than using
one set of regression parameters to value the growth rate security for any number of holding
periods, as in (13), we run a separate regression for each investment horizon. That is, the
T-period security is valued using parameters from (17) with h = T. This contrasts with the
T + 1-period security which utilizes the estimated coe cients from a separate regression (17)
with h = T + 1.
To use the KK1 method to calculate  t using (8), one would theoretically have to run
17regressions for h =1 ,2,...,  in order to calculate all of the growth rate security prices.
However, the ﬁniteness of the data set requires that we make an appropriate approximation.
To this end, we calculate the ﬁrst n growth security prices and then ﬁt a line of exponential
decay for the remaining prices4. So long as the estimated prices exhibit negative curvature, the
approximated inﬁnite sums will converge to zero and (8) is well deﬁned. According to equation
(18), the growth security prices will converge to zero as the holding period increases to inﬁnity




j=0  h,ij converge to a constant. Even if they explode, they need
only approach inﬁnity at a rate slower than (1 + r)h.
A potential drawback of the regressions in (17) is that to calculate the value of an h
holding period growth rate security, the number of regressors on the right hand side is equal
to n   h + 1. For example, with just two assets there will be 31 parameters to be estimated to
value the 15 period growth rate security. Depending on the length of the time series, one might
have di culty estimating these parameters with any meaningful precision. As an alternative to
regressing h period growth rates on h one period growth rates, we also regress h period growth
rates on h period returns. We call this the KK2 method. Speciﬁcally, (17) becomes
gy,h,t =  h +
n  
i=1
 h,isi,h,t +  t (19)
For example, if h = 8, we regress the eight period growth rate on the eight period asset returns.
Equation (19) implies that the number of regressors is always equal to n+1, which is independent


















(1 + r)h   1
  n
i=1  h,i
(1 + r)h , (20)
4Speciﬁcally, we ﬁt a line of the form yt = ae
bt where the parameters a and b are determined via standard
non-linear least squares techniques.
18where (1 + r)h   1 is the h period risk-free return.
An important implication of (20) is that as the holding period increases, the price only
converges to zero if the sum of the betas converges to zero. To see that this is the case, consider
the regression for just one asset return
gy,h,t =  h +  hsh,t +  t
The OLS estimate for  h is








t=1(sh,t   ¯ sh)2
Note that the denominator of ˆ  h is the sample variance of the asset return. Assuming that the
asset’s returns over any time interval are non-stationary with a variance that strictly increases
with the length of the interval, then the variance approaches inﬁnity as the return horizon
increases. This implies that ˆ  h converges to zero as h increases. This same argument applies
for a regression with multiple assets. Therefore, the growth rate security prices produced by
(20) do converge to zero, which implies that the equation for  t is well deﬁned.
The major appeal of the KK1 and KK2 approaches is that, as in the BKR paper, the
ultimate quantity of interest, namely the growth rate security price, is only dependent on  , the
 i, and the risk-free rate r. That is, the valuation formulas for  t are completely independent
of any mean reversion, volatility, or other parameters related to either the outﬂow and inﬂow
processes or the asset returns processes. Since the regressions provide estimates of   and the
 i, the only remaining variable to be determined is r. One of the main objections to the BKR
results, raised by Geanakoplos and Zeldes, is that they seem to be driven in large part by the
risk-free rate term structure employed. Speciﬁcally, as indicated above, BKR used the Treasury
Inﬂation Protected Securities (TIPS) term structure at various horizons to discount the relevant
19cash ﬂows. This contrasts with the constant 2.9% rate used by both the SSA and GZ. The
problem with using the TIPS term structure, as previously mentioned, is that it is composed
of yields to maturity which, by deﬁnition, depend on the periodic coupon payments that occur
over the life of the security in addition to the principle payment made at maturity. Therefore,
these yields represent a weighted average of spot rates and, consequently, with an rising term
structure of yields, the yield to maturity for a bond of maturity t will always underestimate the
actual spot rate at time t.5. As a result, the BKR appear to be discounting safe streams at rates
that are somewhat lower than is appropriate. Since zero-coupon TIPS prices are not available
for di erent maturities and since we are valuing streams into the distant future, we choose in
this paper to use the constant risk-free rate of 2.9%. This choice will ensure that our estimate
of SSA’s open group liability does not reﬂect di erences in assume safe interest rates. Note
that in the KK1 and KK2 techniques, the ideal risk-free rate would reﬂect term to maturity
of the growth rate securities being calculated. By using a constant 2.9% for all maturities, we
implicitly assume a ﬂat spot rate curve which will likely under-estimate the values of the growth
rate securities at short horizons and, therefore, under-estimate the open group net liability.
4 Results
To put the methodology described in the previous section to use, we employ data provided
by the SSA’s website6. For the outﬂow variable, y, and inﬂow variable, z, we use quarterly
beneﬁt payments and net contributions, respectively, from the ﬁrst quarter of 1987 until the ﬁrst
quarter of 2009 for a total of 89 observations. These data were then converted to real dollars
for our base period, the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, using the “All Urban Consumers” Consumer
Price Index available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website7. The real values were then
5A spot rate for a given maturity, often called a “zero” rate, is the rate of interest earned on a bond which
pays only a single payment at maturity with no intermediate cash ﬂows (i.e. the rate on a zero-coupon bond).
6The data was downloaded from http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/tsOps.html.
7http://www.bls.gov/cpi/
20seasonally adjusted via the X-12 ARIMA ﬁlter used and provided by the Census Bureau8. For
the asset returns data, we used quarterly returns for the S&P 500 Indexes and the Merrill Lynch
Three Month Treasury and 10 Year Plus total return indexes. All of this data was obtained
from a Datastream terminal. The nominal returns were converted to real returns using the
same CPI as the social security data.
An important implication of the KK1 and KK2 regressions, shown in equations (17) and
(19), respectively, is that constructing a time series of non-overlaping growth rates requires
many data points. Suppose the original time series, i.e. the raw data before calculating growth
rates, has N observations. Using this series to construct growth rates in the dependent variable
produces N
h+1 usable observations. This implies that the data set is severely reduced even
for small values of h. To alleviate this problem, we use overlapping windows to construct
the growth-rate series. For example, if the ﬁrst data point in our series is 1990-Q1, then the
ﬁrst growth rate observation for h = 4 quarters is the growth rate from 1990-Q1 to 1991-Q1.
The second observation is the growth rate from 1990-Q2 to 1991-Q2, rather than 1991-Q1 to
1992-Q2. Continuing this way, the total number of growth rate observations is N   h, which
decreases with h much slower than N
h+1. We also construct the multi-period horizon returns for
the KK2 regressions in this manner. Since we will be using ordinary least squares (OLS) to
estimate the parameters of the model, it is important to point out that constructing the data
in this way imposes a non i.i.d. relationship among the error terms. However, the purpose of
the regressions is not to test hypotheses regarding any of the parameters, but rather to use
the resulting estimates as a measure of the relationship between social security cash ﬂows and
ﬁnancial returns. Even in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serially correlated errors, the
OLS estimates remain consistent.
The results are presented in Tables 1 through 3. We only present the estimates of the net
liability because the regressions themselves are merely a means to an end. All dollar amounts
8http://www.census.gov/srd/www/x12a/
21are trillions of 2009-Q1 dollars. For each of the three methods described in the previous section,
we use three di erent combinations of regressors in addition to a constant:
(I) S&P 500 Index
(II) S&P 500 and Merrill Lynch Three Month T-Bill Total Returns Indexes
(III) S&P 500 Index and the Merrill Lynch Three Month T-Bill and 10 Year Plus Bond Total
Returns Indexes
The columns of Tables 1 through 3 are headed by these roman numerals indicating to which
set of regressors the results belong.
The regression results for the BKR-style regressions, i.e. equations (??) and (14), are
presented in Table 1. Both panels show the present value of beneﬁts paid and net contributions
received as well as the net uncovered liability. In Panel A, the estimates are based on the
regression whose lagged returns produce the highest possible value of R2, which is provided
in parenthesis underneath the present value estimates9. That is, we run regression (14) for
h =0 ,1,...,40 and plug the parameters from the regression with the highest R2 into (15). For
regression (I), the net liability is positive and equal to $62.439 trillion. This contrasts with the
estimates from regressions (II) and (III) which indicate a net surplus, meaning that the present
value of future contributions exceeds that of future beneﬁts.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the estimates using the average across all lag lengths. This
is a useful measure for the BKR-style regressions because there is considerable variance in the
estimated values of the beneﬁts and contributions depending on which lag is used. Some lags
produce deﬁcits while others produce surpluses. However, as Panel B shows, the average values
for all regressors indicate a deﬁcit in the range of $74 to $84 trillion10. The standard errors for
9The value of the adjusted R
2, often denoted ¯ R
2, closely tracks that of R
2 and, accordingly, the results are
the same using either the highest R
2 or ¯ R
2.
10Note that the averages exclude any cases where the parameters do not meet the convergence requirement
previously discussed. This only occurred in regressions (II) and (III) and for only a couple values of h. As a
result of these exclusions, the net obligation in Panel B need not be the di erence between the beneﬁts and
contributions.
22Table 1: BKR-Style Regression Results
Panel A: Values Chosen at Lag with Highest R2
(I) (II) (III)
Beneﬁts $128.193 $81.986 $152.602
(0.064) (0.089) (0.096)
Contributions $65.753 $139.068 $286.180
(0.074) (0.085) (0.209)
Net Obligation $62.439 -$57.082 -$133.578
Panel B: Average Values Across all Lags
Beneﬁts $204.573 $206.654 $189.371
($9.159) ($27.953) ($21.928)
Contributions $125.247 $140.234 $93.177
($10.620) ($23.756) ($9.368)
Net Obligation $79.326 $74.860 $83.345
the averages are presented in parenthesis11.
Table 2 contains the results for the second method. Recall that for this approach, the
price of the h-quarter growth rate security is calculated with parameters from a regression of
h-quarter growth rates on each of the one quarter returns during that period. After calculating
the ﬁrst n growth rate securities, a line of exponential decay can be ﬁtted to approximate the
remaining terms in the sum that cannot be calculated via regression. Table 2 shows the results
for n = 15, 20, and 25. The net liability estimates when the S&P 500 is the only regressor are
all positive and are reasonably close together in the range of $65 to $76 trillion. However, as
with the BKR method, adding the bond indexes to the regressions makes the results unstable.
The regression (II) results nearly triple in going from n = 15 to n = 20. Moreover, the beneﬁts
diverge for n = 25 leading to an exploding deﬁcit. The estimates based on (III) are even more
unstable except in the opposite direction. In that case the contributions diverge even for n = 15.
Note that it was not possible to run regressions for holding periods beyond 20 quarters in case
(III) because the number of regressors relative to the sample size caused errors in the matrix
inversion necessary for ordinary least squares.
11These are not the standard errors of the parameters, but are just simple standard errors for the sample
average dollar estimate.
23Table 2: Long Growth Rates on Short Returns (KK1 Method)
(I) (II) (III)
n = 15 Beneﬁts $133.358 $144.966 $55.697
Contributions $57.987 $90.691 Exploding
Net Obligation $75.372 $49.645 Exploding Surplus
n = 20 Beneﬁts $130.929 $240.144 $42.126
Contributions $57.474 $85.397 Exploding
Net Obligation $73.456 $147.076 Exploding Surplus
n = 25 Beneﬁts $124.065 Exploding -
Contributions $58.476 $78.361 -
Net Obligation $65.589 Exploding Deﬁcit -
The results for the third approach are presented in Table 3. Here the number of regressors
does not grow with the holding period of the growth rate security. As a result, one can calculate
the values of these securities beyond n = 25 quarters. Table 3 shows results for n = 15, 20, 25,
30, 35, and 40 quarters. For regression (I) with n = 15, 20, and 25, and for regression (II) with
n = 15 this method produces net liability estimates that are very similar to those in Table 2.
However, beyond n = 25 the beneﬁts and contributions decrease and increase, respectively, in
a uniform fashion which leads to a decreasing and ultimately negative net liability. Moreover,
regression (III) appears to be unstable and the contributions diverge for all values of n.
As Tables 1 through 3 show, the results are inconclusive. For regression (I), which contains
the S&P 500 as the only stochastic regressor, the net liability is positive and consistently between
$58.4 and $79.3 trillion across all tables except in Table 3 for n greater than 25. Compared
with $15.1 trillion, these estimates imply that the SSA underestimates its unfunded liability by
as much as $41.3 to $64.2 trillion. For regressions (II) the net obligation is considerably more
variable and ranges from positive inﬁnity to negative inﬁnity. The ﬁnite estimates for regression
(II) range from $49.6 to $147.076 trillion on the positive side and -$57.082 to -$404.075 trillion
on the negative side. Lastly, the third set of regressors produces even more unreliable results.
The KK1 and KK2 methods imply exploding surpluses across all values of n.
There are several reasons why the KK1 and KK2 methods produce such highly variable
24Table 3: Long Growth Rates on Long Returns (KK2 Method)
(I) (II) (III)
n = 15 Beneﬁts $131.161 $143.848 $84.062
Contributions $61.361 $97.144 Exploding
Net Obligation $69.800 $46.704 Exploding Surplus
n = 20 Beneﬁts $129.720 $147.546 $80.276
Contributions $60.964 $122.045 Exploding
Net Obligation $68.757 $25.501 Exploding Surplus
n = 25 Beneﬁts $121.542 $133.485 $76.151
Contributions $63.141 $197.610 Exploding
Net Obligation $58.401 -$64.124 Exploding Surplus
n = 30 Beneﬁts $112.095 $110.794 $65.109
Contributions $69.953 $329.877 Exploding
Net Obligation $42.142 -$219.083 Exploding Surplus
n = 35 Beneﬁts $103.821 $96.291 $63.330
Contributions $81.011 $500.366 Exploding
Net Obligation $22.809 -$404.075 Exploding Surplus
n = 40 Beneﬁts $95.442 $88.820 $64.719
Contributions $101.968 Exploding Exploding
Net Obligation -$6.526 Exploding Surplus Exploding Surplus
estimates of the unfunded obligation. First and foremost, the original data set has only 89 points.
This coupled with the reuse of data via overlapping horizons may introduce considerable small
sample bias into the OLS parameter estimates, especially when valuing a growth rate security
with a long holding period. Moreover, the process of ﬁtting an exponential decay for the ﬁrst n
maturities of the growth rate security may be too coarse an approximation. Finite sample noise
may cause price estimates to ﬂuctuate up or down as h increases. Therefore, the ﬁrst n prices
may not accurately reﬂect true exponential decay or even be able to establish the existence of
such a relationship.
Another potentially major factor inﬂuencing our results is the coming demographic shift
in the US population. In abstracting away from all the cohort growth rates that the SSA uses,
our methods put the burden of capturing this very important change on ﬁnancial markets. That
is, we rely on any swells or dips in asset returns to at least partially coincide with major shifts
in the composition of the population. There are many papers that provide some support for
this assumption. Bakshi and Chen (1994), for example, ﬁnd that an increase in the average
25age of a population predicts an increase in the premium for risky assets. Further support for a
substantial relationship between asset prices and demographics is provided in Bergantino (1998).
On the other hand, Poterba (2001) argues that it is di cult to ﬁnd such a robust relationship.
Therefore, it is di cult to characterize the extent to which our assumption is accurate or not.
The only certainty is that the demographic shift will occur as the baby boomers retire and
that this will a ect future social security beneﬁt and contribution cash ﬂows. If the statistical
relationship between demographics and ﬁnancial markets is weak, as suggested by Poterba, then
our open group unfunded obligation estimates could be biased either upwards or downwards.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we estimate the value of the US SSA’s open group unfunded old age,
survivors, and disability insurance obligation. This quantity equals the di erence between the
present value of all future beneﬁt payments and contribution receipts. We believe that this
metric is the most appropriate means by which one can assess the overall health of the social
security system. Unfortunately, given the inﬁnite horizon over which the estimate is formed, it
is the most di cult metric to measure. The SSA takes an actuarial approach and makes three
sets of assumptions regarding various demographic growth rates. They then project current
numbers forward through time using these constant rate assumptions and then discount the
beneﬁt and contribution cash ﬂows back to the present using a constant interest rate. Their
latest o cial estimate of the unfunded liability is $15.1 trillion.
We believe that the actuarial approach, while functional, is too crude because it does not
treat beneﬁts and contributions as risky cash ﬂows. While the Trustees Report does supplement
its actuarial estimates with simulations, their stochastic modeling is based on traditional time
series methods. That is, variables are assumed to have an autoregressive structure so that each
successive period’s value is structurally dependent on past values. While this is a step in the
26right direction, it doesn’t alleviate the fact that there are many variables on which the ultimate
obligation estimate is based. Our approach, on the other hand, abstracts from directly modeling
the demographics directly and treats the growth rates of beneﬁts and contributions as returns
from a hypothetical security. Using the intuition of BKR, we rewrite the open group unfunded
liability as a simple function of the prices of these securities. To value this imaginary asset,
we use the notion of arbitrage pricing theory to argue that the ﬁnancial component of the risk
associated with the beneﬁt and contribution cash ﬂows can be replicated using a set of traded
assets. We then regress the growth rates over various horizons on the returns of di erent assets.
Using these parameter estimates, we then value the hypothetical growth rate security using
asset pricing techniques which have been reﬁned over the past thirty years.
The fruits of our labor are a set of mixed results. For one set of regressors, our estimates of
the unfunded liability are on the order of $58.4 to $75.4 trillion, several times larger than that of
the SSA. However, for other regressors, the results show positive as well as negative obligations.
When short term and long term government issued securities are added to the regression, the
contribution estimates diverge to inﬁnity. These inconsistencies likely reﬂect estimation o 
a relatively short data set, which potentially introduces a considerable amount of noise into
the parameter estimates. Moreover, it is possible that our assumption that ﬁnancial markets
su ciently reﬂect changes in demographics is too strong, which could bias our valuations of the
growth rate security prices. A possible topic of future research is to apply this same technique
not to the growth rates of beneﬁts and contributions themselves, but rather to the per capita
values. This approach would require population projections into the inﬁnite future which adds
an additional degree of complexity to the procedure. Nonetheless, the main idea still relies on
arbitrage pricing theory to price the per capita growth rates base on marketed asset returns.
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28Appendix
For the regressions with contemporaneous asset returns, the derivation of (13) just re-



































































































which shows the result in equation (13).
The price of the T-period growth rate security based on the regressions with lagged asset
prices, (15), is somewhat more involved. Firstly, note that in the case where T   h, the market
component of all future growth rates is known at the current time t because the furthest growth
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where the third equality follows from the assumption that EQ
t [ t+j t+k] = 0 for any j and k.
The case where T > h is derived similarly to the contemporaneous regressions speciﬁca-
tion. That is, we begin by writing each of the outﬂow growth rates as functions of the asset



























Notice that the asset returns in the ﬁrst h terms of the product are known at time t. These
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where the third equality follows from the assumptions that for each asset i, E[ t+jsi,t+k] = 0
and E[ t+j t+k] = 0 for any j and k. Now we can apply the law of iterated expectations T   h
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31Repeating this procedure T   h   1 more times results in:
Gy,t,T =
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Combining the results for T > h with those for T   h conﬁrms equation (15):
Gy,t,T =
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